













University of Rome Three




§1 The presentism/eternalism debate and its ramifications in current philosophy of time

First and foremost among the examples of a misguided metaphysical use of an apparently meaningful notion is given by the pseudo-predicate “is real” which, in current philosophy of time, is very often invoked to create distinctions or debates whose genuinity or clarity, on closer analysis, turns out to be quite difficult to defend. 
One of such distinctions is that between presentists, claiming that only the present “is real”, and eternalists, claiming that the future and the past are “as real as the present”. As an illustration of this debate and of its current importance, consider the following passage, taken from a very authoritative and recent contribution to the metaphysics of persistence in time: «According to eternalism, past and future objects and times are just as real as currently existing ones. Just as distant places are no less real for being spatially distant, distant times are no less real for being temporally distant…According to presentism, on the other hand, only currently existing objects are real. Computers, but not dinosaurs or Mars outposts, exist.» (Sider 2001, p.11, boldface added). 
This debate has gained in respect and momentum via considerations taken from spacetime theories. In particular, since the geometrical formulation of the special theory of relativity, it has been frequently argued that (i) not only does this theory decidedly favors eternalism over presentism, but that (ii) it is even incompatible with the latter view.​[1]​ And apart from, but not independently of, its connection with the ontological interpretation of Minkowski spacetime, the alledged metaphysical divide between presentism and eternalism has been linked with metaphysical issues concerning the nature of persistence in time,​[2]​ the nature of change and the nature of becoming. Just to sketch the connection between the presentist/eternalist debate and becoming, which is easier to present, the received view on becoming has it that only the presentists can make room for its mind-independence, or for an objective coming into being of future events in the present. Given that for the eternalists all events, past present and future, “are equally real”, there cannot be any room for a coming into being in the present of previously unreal events and becoming must be mind-dependent or purely subjective (see Gale 1967, p. 16). In this view, “the unreality of the future” is therefore regarded as a necessary condition for a mind-independent, ontological becoming: in the block-view of the universe, very often associated with the eternalist perspective “forced upon us” by the relativity of simultaneity and the special theory of relativity, we are told that any event tenselessly coexists with any other event, so that nothing can ever come to exist in a spacetime model that, like Minkowski’s, is still regarded as the arena for all processes described by contemporary quantum field theories (except for the gravitational interaction).​[3]​
In the following I will argue that the debate between presentists and eternalists either lacks a clear formulation or is merely semantical. In any case, my conclusion is rather skeptical and antimetaphysical, since I submit that the presentism/eternalism debate should be regarded as having no implications whatsoever both for our understanding of the ontology of Minkowski spacetime and for notions like change, persistence and becoming which, if they have to be mind-independent, must certainly be regarded as being ontological notions. Consequently, we should resist the temptation of invoking the special theory of relativity or the structure of Minkowski spacetime in order to try to adjudicate between a metaphysical view in which only the present is real and a view in which past present and future are equally real. 

§2  The lack of contrast class for the expression “the reality of the future (past)”​[4]​

As I see it, the main trouble raised by the claim that “the future is real” is that this claim has no “contrast class”. What I mean by this expression has been wonderfully clarified by Austin more than 40 years ago: «The function of the word ‘real’ – he wrote – “is not to contribute positively to the characterization of anything but to exclude possible ways of being not real - and these ways are both numerous for particular kinds of things, and liable to be quite different for things of different kinds» (Austin, 1962, p.70).​[5]​ Taking Austin’s hint, the important question to be answered in order to ascertain the existence of a genuine, ontic disagreement between presentists and eternalists is the following: “how could the future or the past fail to be real”? If, as Sider has it, according to the presentist “only currently existing objects are real”, it follows that there must be a clear sense in which non-currently existing objects are unreal. (what above is referred to as the contrast class of “is real”). But what, exactly, is being denied by the presentist’s implication that the future “is not real” or simply “does not exist” above and beyond than the platitude that it does not exist now? 
Let us look at some cases in which there is a clear contrast class between “real” and “not real”. We understand the difference between: “this is real coffee” in contrast to “this is a pure surrogate” (Ersatz), or “this is a real disaster” in contrast to “the problem is not so serious”, or “this is the real color of the painting”, in contrast to “this is the surface color”, or “this is a real horse” in contrast to a picture of a horse. 
In our case, however, we seem to be in a different predicament: if “the reality of the future” simply means that “there will be events occurring after now” (what else could it mean?), there seems to be no plausible way in which the future could be unreal as the presentist has it, unless we had evidence for an immediate end of the universe! Since there is no contrast class between a real future and an unreal future as in the examples of the previous paragraph, it is hard to make sense of the debate in question, namely to see how presentists and eternalists as described by Sider could disagree. Notice, furthermore, that if the difference between the presentist and the eternalists must have ontological significance, any recourse to the indefiniteness of truth-value of future-tense propositions vis à vis the definiteness of present-tense propositions will not be of much help, since this indefiniteness has a mere semantic significance. Explaining something ontological with a semantic move is unsatisfactory, since presentists and eternalists can agree that some future-tense propositions may lack now a definite truth-value for epistemic reasons, while agreeing that some future event or other will occur, thereby agreeing that the future “is real”. Claiming that the origin of, or the reason for assuming, the semantic difference between present tense and future tense propositions is ontological is of course a mere petitio principii, since we want to know what such an ontic difference amounts to. 
When the eternalist claims that “the future (generically regarded) is as real as the present”– a misleading way to state the position, but expedient for showing that the debate with the presentists is genuine– all that she must be understood to be affirming is that “there will be a future (generically regarded)”. There is nothing particularly interesting about these claims, as soon as we emphatically add that they do not imply that “the future (whatever will be the case, generically regarded), or any particular future event E, exists now as an event in space does”. 
In other words, even if, for some descriptive purposes, it can be useful to represent the whole history of the world as being somehow completely “given”, with time viewed as a wholly spacelike dimension within a four-dimensional block, we should not forget that once we are given a particular event in time (a point in the block), the eternalist can (and should) distinguish between events that, relative to that point, have already occurred, and events that will occur.​[6]​ If the successive occurring of events – in which becoming consists​[7]​ – is a mind-independent feature of the universe, it is not legitimate to conflate a “static” representation of time with the thing that is being represented.​[8]​ 
The antecedent of the conditional must be granted simply because also in Minkowski spacetime timelike-separated events are objectively, invariantly timelike-related, and events, by definition, occur or happen. They do so, so to speak, a priori. If any two events are tenselessly timelike separated, and a reasonable arrow of time can be assumed, one event will happen after the other and this suffice to assume the mind-independence of (tenseless) becoming: the fact that in a block view timelike-separated events exist at their location, as one often hears, does not mean that they are all simultaneous, but simply that one even occurs and then the other does. And the events’ very being is their occurring. 
Summarizing, the representation in which all events are given, and time is like an extra-dimension of space is a mere picture; the thing being represented, however, is the “real” world or the real spacetime, characterized by events objectively and mind-independently following one another in time. No sensible eternalist will argue that the events along the temporal dimension of the universe are all simultaneous with each other (as in a Totum Simul), because otherwise such events could not occur, as they actually do, in temporal succession. But if events occur in succession, then there is form of becoming consisting of such successive occurrence, and events cannot coexist simultaneously as they do in space.
I want to suggest that it is only a misleading interpretation of the “as-real-as-claim” in Sider’s quotation above that creates the impression of a “real” difference between eternalism and presentist.​[9]​ In other words, it is only if the eternalist interprets the “future-as-real-as-the-present-claim” as the absurd view that all events are simultaneous with each other that a difference with the presentist would be available. If the eternalist refuses, as she should, to accept this absurdity, how can the presentist avoid any form of existential commitment to future events? We have seen that if the presentist accepts as true that “it will be the case that some object or other exists”, where “exists” is present tense, then she will be committed to the same view allegedly defended by here enemy, the eternalist, namely “the reality of the future”. The only way to avoid a collapse of the presentist’s position on the eternalist one seems to consists in arguing that “it will be the case that something or some event E exists” does not amount to an existential commitment to that something, because the quantifier is inside the scope of the tense operator F (“it will be the case that”). It not by chance that this is exactly the line taken by the Sider (2004),​[10]​ which will be discussed in the following.
Before going to that move, however, if we agree with the defenders of the genuinity of the debate that the presentist has to deny any sort of tensed existential commitment to future events or objects, then we must recognize that she is in a bad predicament. I take it, in fact, that the presentist cannot be interpreted as denying that, as of the present moment, the world will have some future or other, or, equivalently, as affirming that the world will end after the present moment. If I am right about this, if the end of the world is not what is at stake, at least in this reading there seems to be no genuine “contrast class” between the presentist and the eternalist about the ontological status of the future, i.e., no real ontological difference between them. 
This diagnose, of course, will be judged to be too quick by the antiseptic. However, I think that I have eliminated from the possible candidates at least one sense of “being unreal”, referred to future events: if the contrast class concerned eschatology, the belief that what we call “the same persisting world” annihilates after each present instant is, luckily, being constantly refuted by experience. So we should abandon it in light of induction and admit, presentists and eternalists alike, that there will be some future, but should not cash this belief in terms of the misleading expression “the reality of the future”, because in this case we would have no plausible contrast class for “real”. 
§2.1 Occasionalism to the rescue?
Let us see whether it is possible to make sense of the view that the future is unreal in some alternative way. A first attempt is to try to engage in some wildly speculative occasionalist metaphysics, following the footprints of Descartes: «For it is quite clear to anyone who carefully considers the nature of time that the same power and action are needed to conserve anything at each individual moment of its duration as would be required to create that thing anew if it were not yet in existence. Hence, the distinction between conservation and creation is only conceptual, and this is one of the things evident by the natural light» (Descartes, 1644/1985, vol. II, p. 33). The presentist could then affirm that presentism entails or means that at each instant what we call “the world” is created anew, and duration in time or persistence of the selfsame world is an illusion. Consequently, if we identify a different world with each different instant of time, it would be true to claim, at each time, that there is no future, since “future” might be indexical to each instantaneous world, as “actual” is in Lewis’ theory of possible worlds (Lewis 1986). In each present moment, each world, or better, world-slice, would have no future, since a different world would be created at each different instant of time.
Despite this move is not incoherent, I will assume that presentists shouldn’t go so far as rediscovering the heavy metaphysics of continuous creation just to save their own theory: the remedy seems worse than the disease. And besides, what would prevent one from using the future tense operator to refer to the different world that will be created after the present and claim that “there will be an act of creation of a different world”? 
If anything, this reference to occasionalism has the merit of reminding us of a possible theological origin of presentism (apart from the important role of tenses in ordinary language): if God creates (or recreates) the world all at once (or at each instant of time), then there must be the same objective present across all the universe.

§3 A second blow at the debate: the pluralistic nature of existence 

Another, more promising way to defend the view that there exists genuine disagreement between presentists and eternalists is resort to existential quantification, and forget about the alluring but vacuous charm of “is real”. Not by chance, Sider’s quotation above ends with the claim that for presentists, dinosaurs and Mars outpost don’t exist. However, Sider adds, in order to have genuine disagreement, we must make sure that presentists and eternalists do not mean different things when referring to existence (Sider 2001, p.15). 
However, to use Sider’s examples, the question whether dinosaurs and human outposts on Mars are in the domain of quantification of the true theory of the world, in a broadly quinean sense, may not admit a univocal answer, or better, it may have an answer depending on our descriptive aims. We must live with the fact that, at least in the philosophical literature, “existence”, or “there exists”, is ambiguous between tensed and tenseless existence: 
DEF1 Event e exists in a tensed sense of “existence” just in case it exists now.
DEF2 Event e exists in a tenseless sense just in case it existed, exists now, or will exist. DEF2Alt Alternatively, and equivalently, e exists in a tenseless sense just in case it exists at a particular time-place by occupying a region of spacetime.
Attempts at arguing that there is just a univocal sense of existence, as if we had a broadly Quinean criterion of ontological commitment with no further qualification, seem to be contradicted by the fact that, for example, for the Platonist mathematical existence is not physical existence, given that the former is abstract and the latter is concrete, spatiotemporally extended existence.​[11]​ If we did not distinguish between mathematical and physical existence, we would not be able to distinguish those philosophers having a naturalistic position about mathematical existence from the platonists, who believe that there are also non-natural, non spatiotemporally extended entities (namely, the mathematical ones). The mode of existence is fundamental in the enterprise of ontology: paraphrasing Aristotle’s famous words, “of existence one can speak in many ways”. 
This remark also serves to attack the sweeping generalization according to which “if there is no genuine ontological distinction between presentists and eternalist then no ontological debate is genuine” (Sider 2001, pp. 16-17). Perhaps the debate between actualists and possibilists​[12]​ falls in the same category of the presentists/eternalists one, but other ontological debates can rely on clearer ways of articulating their positions. “Are mathematical entities real or not?” gets translated, for instance, into “are mathematical entities abstract or purely mental or fictional?” These questions are different from the issues dividing eternalists and presentists (and possibilism from actualism) since they admit a well-posed contrast class (compare Sider 2001, pp. 16-17).
Analogously, given the existence of a philosophical debate whether as of the present moment “dinosaurs exist” or not, the temptation to think that (a) two different senses of existence are in play, and (b) the dispute between presentists and eternalists should be cashed as being about which of the two is more fundamental, is very strong. In the next section I will explore this possibility and show that put it in this terms, however, the debate between presentists and eternalists is purely semantical, and has no ontological consequences. As such, it cannot have any import on our understanding of the ontology of Minkowski spacetime, of becoming, of the nature of change or of persistence in time. 

§4 A debate on which of the two senses of existence is more fundamental?

Let us go back to the definitions given above: 
DEF1 Event e exists in a tensed sense of “existence” just in case it exists now.
DEF2 Event e exists in a tenseless sense just in case it existed, exists now, or will exist. 
As we can see, the use of “there exists” presupposed by the first definition is to be contrasted with the one presupposed by the second. The first definition just refers to what exists in the present or exists now, leaving aside problems about the nature and ontological status of the present; the second uses the disjunction “was or is now or will” and has the purpose of capturing the distinction between concrete and abstract existence. The contrast class of the second definition, the legitimacy of its use, lies in the class of abstract, non-spatiotemporally extended entities, like sets, functions or classes, whether they exist, as platonists have it, or are just fictions. In both cases, Def2 is needed because we need a distinction between concretely existing entities and abstract/fictional “entities”, which are not in spacetime.
As hinted above, a defender of the view that the contrast between eternalists and presentists is genuine could claim that “there exist dodos” is true for the presentist and false for the eternalist, because they disagree about the meaning of the existential quantifier, or put it differently, disagree about which of the two senses of “existence” is more fundamental. 
The presentists tell us that tensed existence is more fundamental (after all, in most natural languages it is certainly more entrenched) and therefore “there are human outposts on Mars” is false. The eternalist will immediately note that the statement in question “is false now” (false at a certain instant of time) but that it might be true that “there will be outposts on Mars”. The presentist will say that “is false now” is redundant because “is false” already presupposes “is false now”, since the italicized copula is tacitly but fundamentally tensed. 
Notice, however, that even granting that the tensed sense of existence and the tensed copula are more fundamental than the tenseless ones will not help much against the assault of the skeptic. First of all, as long as truth is relativized at instants of time, it seems difficult to deny a commitment to the future existence of outposts for both the presentist and the eternalist. Of course, the presentist can deny that any past or future tense statement is true, so the debate is now captured in terms of presence or absence of definite truth-values, but we have already seen why this semantic move is not to be recommended. Secondly, if we recall that the presentist is committed to the unreality of any future (past) event, the claim whose truth-value is to be evaluated is not a particular one about the presence of human outposts on Mars, but rather one concerning whether it will be the case or not that something will occur or will exist”. In this latter case it is difficult to imagine how the presentist could consistently deny it without falling into the position that we have already refuted, namely that there is no future because the world will end. The more fundamental character of “there exist” (tensedly) does not exclude commitment to the existence of the future (of some future event) in such a way as to dissolve any alledged ontological divide.
In a nutshell, the main problem in this second way of capturing the debate seems to revolve around the meaning of “more fundamental”. If, in a moderate and tolerant reading of “more fundamental”, “the greater degree of fundamentality” of tensed existence does not entail that the other, tenseless sense of existence is outlawed, then presentists and eternalist will agree that “it will be the case that some event e occurs (tensedly)”. This either entails “e will occur” or it entails that e exists tenselessly on the basis of the following definition.
DEF2alt2 “e tenselessly exists just in case it was the case that e exists (tensedly), or e exists (tensedly) or it will be the case that e exist (tensedly)”. In both cases, there seems to be no disagreement between presentists and eternalists.
If, instead, the reading of “more fundamental” were more radical and intolerant, a presentist might end up refusing the legitimacy of any tenseless sense of existence. In this latter case, however, it would be hard to see on which ground presentists could regard DEF2 as meaningless, given that it is not prima facie inconsistent. Furthermore, also presentists need to distinguish between an event existing in spacetime and fictional entities like Pegasus, and banning DEF2 would deprive them of an indispensable resource. While a future event f will be in spacetime (supposing that it will occur, so as to leave irrelevant epistemic worries about warrant aside), Pegasus’ flight toward the Sun has not occurred, is not occurring now, and will never occur.
Notice that once the two senses of existence are admitted, presentism, if it commits itself to the future existence of something, becomes either a triviality or a contradiction. If the presentist denied that “any future event exists (alternatively, is real)” by relying on the tensed sense of existence (exists = exists now) or on the tensed copula, she would be peddling a triviality: “the future is not real or does not exist =def what will exist (‘the future’) is not existing now (is not now occurring), that is, what will exist is not existing now. 
But if, on the other hand, the sense of existence in “does not exist” is tenseless (alternatively, the copula “is” in “is real” is tenseless), the minimalist assumption that the world will not end leads to a contradiction. Supposing that at least something will exist or occur (has existed, has occurred), that something is (tenselessly) existent in virtue of DEF2, and it cannot be (tenselessly) non-existent as presentism has it. Recall that, according to Def2, the claim “e does not exist” in a tenseless sense means that “e did not exist and does not exist now and will not exist”. Once again, presentists are forced to say that literally there will be no future at all after the present (there was no past), that the world has an end after now, because as soon as they admit that something will occur (has occurred), then they must admit that that something exists (tenselessly). And we have already seen that this apocalyptic position is too absurd to be considered as a plausible defense of presentism. 

§5 Platonism and presentism 

Consider the following example due to Sider. An eternalist believing in sets would endorse the claim that there exists (tenselessly) a set containing a dinosaur and a computer, but the platonic presentist will reject the disjunction​[13]​: “it was the case that (x) (x is a set containing a dinosaur and a computer)), or it is the case that ((x) (x is a set containing a dinosaur and a computer)) or it will be the case that ((x) (x is a set containing a dinosaur and a computer)). Since at no time computers and dinosaur coexist, according to Sider the eternalist believes in something that the presentist denies, namely the existence of the above set (Sider 2001, p. 15-16).
This argument is not as convincing as may appear at the outset. Sider notes that in order to give the example all its force, both parts must accept the principle that sets exist only if their members exist (Sider, 2001, p.16). Otherwise, there would be no difference between the eternalist and the presentist, since both could admit the existence of sets whose members never existed. But why should presentists endorsing the existence of sets qua abstracta accept the highly restrictive principle according to which such an existence depends on the temporal coexistence of their members or on the simultaneity of their time-slices? It would be strange to let sets exist only on the condition that their members coexist at the same time, since, after all, sets, if they exist, are abstract entities, whose members may well lack any temporal extension at all: think of sets of numbers or of functions. It would be odd to require that sets of numbers exist only if their members coexist in time, since numbers don’t exist in time at all and even more ad hoc to introduce a criterion for the existence of sets of concrete objects which has no correspondence in the case of sets whose members are abstract.
Summarizing, to the effect that sets are abstract entities, and the word “set” in our example doesn’t simply stand for the concrete “object” which results from the disconnected sum or “fusion” of a computer with a dinosaur, we seem to be introducing an implausible constraint. Since a set containing a computer and a dinosaur is neither a computer nor a dinosaur nor both, it is abstract if it exists, and abstract objects are not located in time by definition. So the disjunction “there was a set composed by a computer and a dinosaur, or there is a set composed by a computer and a dinosaur or there will be a set composed by a computer and a dinosaur” looks like a misapplication of tensed language in a domain to which it does not belong. It follows that also the presentist believing in sets should accept, along with her alledged enemy the eternalist, that there exists (atemporally) a set containing a computer and a dinosaur, because the object in question (the set) does not exists in a tenseless sense, but rather in an atemporal sense, even though its two members never coexist at the same time. 
It remains to be seen whether presentists can use the future (and past) tense operators without any commitment to the existence of the past and the future. To my knowledge, the philosopher who gone further in defending this possibility is Theodore Sider (who is no presentist), and who claims that existential quantifiers inside the scope of the tensed operators carry no existential commitments. I will now briefly explore this possibility to conclude the paper.

§6 Tensed existence and nested quantifiers

More recently Sider has presented a more sophisticated argument against the skeptic. Consider the claim that “it is possible that unicorns exist”:  
		  ((x) (Ux))									(1)
In modal actualism, Sider notes that (1) does not imply the existence of unicorns, because within this position, possibilia do not exist: within actualism, the presence of the existential quantifier inside the scope of the modal possibility operator by itself does not commit one to existence claims. For the possibilist, on the contrary, (1) implies existence, by definition of possibilism. Sider tries to establish a parallel between (1) above and “it will be the case that (label it with F) there exist outposts on Mars” (O) 
                 F((x) (Ox))							                     (2)
which, according to him, would not carry any existential commitment, if one is presentist and will do so only on an eternalist metaphysics. 
First of all, one should agree that in (1) we can deny commitment to existence only if we presuppose actualism, which entails that the meaning of the embedded quantifier is going to depend on one’s prior metaphysical commitments. Symbols, logical or mathematical alike, do not carry their interpretation on their sleeves, so to speak, and ably resorting to logic as Sider does in the rest of his (2004) may not be sufficient to establish metaphysical disagreement. 
Two arguments can be provided against Sider’s claim. First, (1) cannot be invoked to defend the legitimacy of denying ontological commitment to future existence in (2) since, despite the strong formal and semantical analogy, the case of the actualism/presentism dispute is different from the one that is our concern in this paper. While we know what it means for an actualist (or for the famous “person in the street”) to claim that unicorns don’t exist (or that they are simply possible entities), namely that they are not spatiotemporally extended, we still lack a clear meaning for the claim that the future (the past) does not exist, except the “apocalyptic” interpretations rejected above. In a word, using the terminology introduced above, (1) has a contrast class that (2) lacks and this suffices to show that the two cases are to be treated differently: (1)’s existential commitment, unlike (2)’s, depends on a clearly describable metaphysical difference. If the semantics of F((x)(Ox)) can be spelled out as “there will be a moment of time in which there are outposts on Mars”, the commitment to the future instant seems unavoidable.	
This semantic rule seems to express the following intuition: the presentist still needs to refer to past (future) objects by claiming, for instance that Newton lived in England and wrote the Principia, or that “Uncle Robert will ring the bell at noon”. Frankly, I cannot see how one can use this tensed language in ordinary language without implying that Newton existed or the event in question will occur (it will be the case that it occurs). And even if we were prescriptivist about the use of “there exists”, namely we decided to be revisionist about the implications or implicatures of ordinary tensed language, the argument that that tenses are more natural and fundamental because more entrenched in our linguistic practice would boomerang against the presentist, since this language entails commitment to at least some past and future events.
A second argument that Siders uses in order to show that F(x:Gx) (there will be an x such that Gx) is not existentially committing to future events is given by the fact that while two restricted “eternalist” quantifiers over future events commute, two iterated tensed operator don’t, because they presuppose an evaluation point in time (Sider 2004, p.9). If we say that at some point in the future, there will exist an H and that at some moment after that, there will exist a G such that  – F((x:Hx) F(y:Gy)) – we are clearly not claiming that at some point in the future, there will exist a G and that at some moment after that, there will exist a H such that  – F((y:Gy)F(x:Hx)). Suppose that (F x:Gx) stands for “Some future G is ” and (F x:Hx)stands for “Some future H is ”then 
(F x:Gx)(F x:Hx)is logically equivalent to its commutated expression 
(F x:Hx) (F x:Gx) 
From the fact that the correspondent restricted tenseless quantifiers commute, Sider concludes that the tensed operator F and P, when they precede an existential quantifier, are not themselves quantifiers. However, from this argument once can only derive at best that the two symbolic expressions (Fx:Gx) and F(x:Gx) have a different inferential content, and therefore a different use. But one can grant that without being forced to admit that xPx or xFx are not quantifiers! 
I am not doing justice at the complexity of Sider’s (2004) paper and I cannot do it here: what is completely obscure to me is why the translation of the formula F((x Gx) F(x Hx)) – namely “at some point in the future, there will exist an G and that at some moment after that, there will exist a H such that ” – is not a quantified one, and does not commit the presentist to the existence of a future G and a future H. I must also add that I am in favor of the use of any technical resource (logic included) in order to argue in favor of a particular metaphysical thesis; however, a display of technicalities to show that “it was (will be) the case that there is (present tense) an eclipse” does not commit one to the past existence and the future existence of an eclipse seems to me wholly misguided. 
I hope that it is clear from what I have written so far that I am not attacking the presentist and defending the eternalist’s position. I am simply arguing that the presentist has no way to deny commitments to future (past) events, and that therefore, when the two senses of existence are carefully distinguished, her position cannot be distinguished meaningfully from the allegedly opposed one, the eternalist’s. 
Furthermore, it is important to stress that my conclusion does not depend in any way on the possibility that tensed and tenseless theorists of time have a genuine disagreement over the nature of the present, regarded as a mind-independent property by the former, and as a subjective element denoted by an indexical by the latter. Suppose “being present” is a mind-independent property of events: the presentist must still claim that some event will be present if the world does not come to an end, and therefore that, in the tenseless sense of existence, it exists by being part of spacetime or by being occurring somewhere and somewhen after the present moment, while, of course, not existing now. There seems to be no way for the presentist to distinguish her position from the eternalist’s insofar as the dispute is construed as involving the existence or reality or the unreality non-existence of the future (past).
By invoking Carnap’s teaching, we could state the above in a single sentence: the presentist/eternalist debate originates from an illicit transformation of a pragmatic difference into an ontological gap. Rather, we should say that sometimes, according to our different purposes, we rely on the tensed sense of existence, and then we take a perspectival attitude toward it; some other times, for different, mostly scientific purposes, we rely on a tenseless sense of existence and we look at reality from “nowhen”, by counting as existent any past, or present or future event. This pragmatic attitude is also essential in showing the compatibility between Minkowski spacetime and the theory of becoming mentioned above and briefly developed in the following section. 

§7 Consequences for the philosophy of time and the ontology of Minkowski spacetime	

If my skeptical conclusions on the presentist/eternalist debate are correct, various noteworthy consequences on the philosophy of time must be drawn. The most obvious one is that if the debate between presentists and eternalists is not genuine, the various attempts to use the theory of relativity and in particular the features of Minkowski spacetime to vindicate one position (eternalism) over the other become completely otiose. Likewise, those attempts at modifying the theory of relativity to make it compatible with presentism (through the addition of a privileged frame, of a now, and so on) must suffer the same fate.​[14]​ 
Granting that the previous sections have offered a correct diagnosis of the status of the presentist/eternalist debate, our understanding of becoming must also undergo a radical change. 
Despite their disagreement about how to interpret Minkowski spacetime, Putnam (1967) and Stein (1991) seemed to agree that the problem of making room for objective becoming in Minkowski spacetime was linked to the possibility of having an indefinite or unreal future. So, even though Putnam claimed that the future of any event e of Minkowski spacetime had to be regarded as “wholly real” while Stein argued that if there is becoming then for any event e in Minkowski spacetime there are at least some other events that count as “indefinite” relative to e, they shared the wrongheaded view that the true divide between the friends and the foes of becoming concerned the ontological status of future events.​[15]​ 
However, we have seen that there cannot be any genuine disagreement about this point. Consequently, becoming is not to be understood as the becoming real or determinate in the present of previously unreal events: if there is becoming, it is crucial to acknowledge that the asymmetry it imposes on the structure of time both in Stein as well as in Clifton and Hogarth’s theorems is not ontological, as between the real and the unreal, but simply physical or structural, in strict connection with the various asymmetries constituting the arrow of time (Horwich 1987). This view of becoming is more fully developed in another paper (see note 7) but has been defended in a different context, and with different arguments, also by Tim Maudlin.​[16]​ 
Not by chance, the two possible candidate for a becoming relation definable in terms of the structure of Minkowski spacetime, past timelike connectibility and past causal connectibility (Clifton and Hogarth 1995) are asymmetric, the asymmetry being inherited by of the causal relation or the temporal precedence relation. Clearly, if this asymmetry is not of an ontic type, as we have been arguing so far, it must concern the issue of the arrow of time, namely the explanation of the origin and nature of temporally asymmetric or irreversible phenomena in time. 
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^1	  See among others, Putnam (1967), Rietdijk (1966) and (1976), and Saunders (2002). For a different view, see Stein (1968), Weingard (1972), Stein (1991), Craig (2000). I have myself contributed to the debate in Dorato (1995).
^2	  In a rough characterization of the problem of change and persistence in time, we could raise the following questions: do entities persist (or change) in time by perduring, i.e., by having different temporal parts at different times (event-ontology) or by enduring, i.e., by remaining identical to themselves and being wholly present in time while instantiating different properties at different times (things ontology)? The best recent overview of this debate is in Sider (2001).
^3	  General relativity is of course more fundamental than the special theory, but we still don’t know how to connect it with quantum field theory.
^4	  For simplicity and in discussing the presentist’s position in relation to the issue of becoming, I will limit my considerations to the ontological status of the future, but the same considerations apply, symmetrically, also to the past.
^5	  Reference to Austin in this context has been brought to the fore also by Yuval Dolev, who, independently of me, has argued on a similar line in the paper presented at the Montreal conference. 
^6	  Whether this distinction is local or global will depend on details about the spacetime structure we are considering.
^7	  See Dorato (2002), Savitt (2001) and Dorato (forthcoming). Dennis Dieks is now independently arguing in favor of a similar view.
^8	  In a paper presented at the Montreal conference, a similar point has been stressed also by Richard Arthur.
^9	  I am not suggesting that Sider is guilty of this misinterpretation.
^10	  I thank Theodore Sider for permission to refer to a paper in progress.
^11	  This is a response to an objection raised by an anonymous referee.
^12	  According to Sider, possibilism is defined as the view that “reality also contains merely possible things” (Sider 2001, p. 12), while modal actualism decrees that reality only contain actual entities. One may wonder what it means to claim that, for the possibilist, merely possible things are real, if “real” also implies actual, since at this point, by letting “possible” mean “non-actual”, we would have that “non-actual things are actual”! And if the meaning of “real” does not entail “actual”, then the dispute between possibilism and actualism seems, once again, purely verbal or semantical.  
^13	  John Bigelow is an example of a presentist that is a realist about mathematical objects: this is a consistent position to hold.
^14	  See Rakic (1997).
^15	  To be fair with Stein, he did not defend becoming, but simply its compatibility with Minkowski spacetime.
^16	  For a recent survey on the arrow of time, see Albert (2001)
^17	  For this view, see Dorato (1995) and Tooley (1997).
